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SOME ASPECTS OF EXPENDITURES: OF 
THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENCE AGENCY 
By 
Yasuhiko SHIMA * 
I. Characterhitc Aspects of The Defence Agency Expenditure 
As Seen From Audit Report. 
InJanuary this year (1955) the Superintendent of the Board of Audit is 
reported to have drawn the attention of the Chief Secretary to the instances 
of the government budgetary funds not being expended effectively, men-
tioning three major such instances, in which wasteful expenditUres by the 
Defence Agency in connection with the procurement of various materials 
and equipments were cited together with the extravagant granting of sub-
sidies to provincial public communities and overgenerous purchases of food-
stuffs from overseas. It was pointed out, in this connection, that, as the 
expenditures for defence, or, in other words, military expenditures, including 
supplementary budgetary appropriation~ and reserve funds, expended since 
the inauguration of the Police Reserve in 1950, cases of improper spending 
for the procurement of war supplies as well as of official corruption have ' 
remarkabls mounted in number. Recently it was reported that the offices 
of the Procurement headquarters of the Defence Agency are daily being 
flocked by hordes of businessmen and contractors, that the prices provisi-
onally Eet by the Procurement officials for the purchase of supplies freely 
" leak" to the parties interested, and that the procurement plans, including 
items and suppliers of various supplies, set by the Army and Navy staff 
officers, respectively, are known before they come to the knowledge of the, 
officials of the Defence Agency. Such, however, is not a phenomenon seen 
only after the war; in the years before Japan's defeat in the last war, cases 
of improper budgetary appropriatiom of military funds were not few. 
Seeing that military expenditures in nature would cover, to a considerable 
extent, the effects of a business depression, it should be only natural that 
busine,smen vie among each other for a share of money to be spent. This, 
in turn, tends to strengthen the position of one who holds the money and 
similar cases of corruption will occur. Seen from this angle alone, the recent 
* The authur is proffessor of economics at Kyoto University 
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instances of official corruption including bribery cases appear to be of the 
same category as before the war. 
A careful perusal of the papers released by the Board of Audit, however, 
convinces us of the existence of some hitherto-unknown peculiar aspects 
involved in the post-war cases of misdemeanor. For instance, the Superin-
tendent of the Board of Audit, alluded to earlier, said, in part, in his 
explanation: 
" ...... Many instances were seen in which procurement was made for 
purposes not considered urgent and to an amount evidently over-high, which 
was obviously incompatible with the existing status of unit organization and 
training situation, as well as cases of wasteful spending resulting from an 
insufficient understanding of the functional properties and standards of the 
war supplies ordered ....... " Already in the" Audit Report for the Fiscal 
Year, 1952-53," we find the following passages: 
"Whereas, with regard to the procurement of non-urgent supply items 
for the Security Forces, it is stipulated that the personnel of the corps and 
necessary supplies be implemented according to a fixed program patterned 
,after the American counterpart, and that the fixed number of personnel 
and supplies be divided by the projected years of wear, the result thus 
gained serving as the basis level which should be filled by replenishment 
each year; the general tendency has been so that the fixed number of 
personnel. and equipment has been automatically procured without the 
actual situation and needs in existence." Quoting actual instances of such 
wasteful and unrealistic spending as cited in the &ame report, the following 
could be mentioned: 
The Army staff of the Security Board stipulated that the number of 
wire operation vehicles to be held by the Board should be fixed at sixty, 
all of which were to be purchased by the fiscal year 1952-53 and contracts 
therefor were duly entered into (To break down the number: 54 vehicles 
in all to one district communication battalion and one communications 
organization battalion, each battalion consisting of three companies, and 
nine vehicles being allotted to each company, and four to one communica-
tion operation battalion and two for reserve.). In addition to this, six 
vehicles (unit price: ¥ 2,922,000, making the tonal ¥ 17,832,000) were 
purchased in December, 1953 from the Isuzu Motorcar Co., Ltd. However, 
actually, the Communications Organization Battalion consists of two, instead 
of three, companies, hence eighteen vehicles will be the proper number to be 
allotted, making the total fifty-one, instead of sixty. Thm, nine vehicles are 
left out as a surplus. Even allowing for five or six new cars to be supplemen 
ted, it would seem that no new purchases were required for the 1952-53 year. 
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Another instance: The Army Staff decided lhat 3,787 anti-air cloth 
plates would be needed for the entire 110,000 personnel of the Security 
Force. For this purpose, 4,656 were purchased up till 1952-53 year, fol-
lowed by the purchase of 131 to fill up the gap and another supplementary 
898 in the 1953-54 year. In the 1954-55 year, 898 for replenishment 
purpose were purchased, making the total 1,927, amounting to ¥ 12,429,150 
in value. The fact, however, is that these anti-air cloth plates are not 
frequently employed in the course of unit exercises; not only this, but 
actually the program of training was first formulated at the time the Board 
of Audit come out to launch an on-the-spot probe of the situation. It is 
evident, from this, all these expenditures were superfluous. 
Besides the above-mentioned cases of purchases of non-urgent items, 
numerous instances may be cited of purchases of supplies equipped with 
unnecessarily-high efficiency and of those of superior efficiency being pre-
vented from working to the fullest of such efficiency when combined with 
those of inferior efficiency. The Report, already referred to, points out 
that the reason for this should be found in the prevailing tendency to 
"imitate indiscriminately the standards used by the American armed forces, 
disregarding the actual situation of the Security Force." 
To prove this, the instance of the purchase from the Fuji Trading 
Company of 67 sets of motor-generators (for communication apparatus) to 
the amount of ¥ 86,412,000, could be cited. As it was found that the 
standards of the motors followed those of the American armed forces, the' 
generators, out-powered, were found to be unusable in combination with 
the motors. The communication apparatus, for which these generators are 
to be used, has not yet been purchased, with the consequence that these 
generators cannot be offered for actual uses and just stored away. To add 
up to this, loans were subsequently made by the Americans, and, now, the 
situation is that a total of 119 sets of generators are idle and stocked. 
Again, the case of the purchase from the Kokusai Electric Company 
of 903 vehicular wireless sets at a cost of ¥ 1,173,523,300 could be cited. 
These, on the basis of an ad vertum translation of American specifications, 
were intended for use both on truck and tank. When used on truck, I3-volt 
would be used, and, on tank, 24-volt. And, for this purpose, two different 
kinds of convertors were purchased. Japanese stipulation, however, provides 
that motor-generators of a different pattern be mounted on tank, and, thus, 
it is seen that 24-volt convertors, purchased on the basis of a translation 
of American specifications, were rendered entirely useless and unnecessary. 
The reason why the present writer has taken the trouble of introducing 
several instances of improper fund appropriations cited in the Report of 
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the Board of Audit is because, specifically, he is inclined to think that 
they serve to bring to the fore certain important aspects of post-war mili-
tary expenditures. This was already pointed out in the Report for the 
1952-53 year, when it asserted that" It was due to the fact that the pur-
chase program of the Agency was put to execution in utter disregard of 
the actual condition relative to the personnel, installations and mechanical 
equipment" that the Agency tended to purchase supplies for non-urgent 
purposes or to store them away unused. It would be said that the 1953-
54 Report went a step further to clarify the causes for such irregularities. 
Imitation of American army standards alone, of course, should not be con-
strued as constituting the factors which contributed to the deplorable 
situation being brought about. Further, a careful perusal of the Report 
tells that such situation had existed even before 1952. Thh 1950-51 Report 
(at the time the Police Reserve was inaugurated.) contains passages indica-
tive of factors involving something more important. Of ¥ 20,000,000,000 
appropriations for the Police Reserve, ¥ 13,200,000,000 was actually spent 
within the prescribed year, ¥6,700,000,000 was left over to the following 
vear and ¥20,000,000 was found unneeded. This, of course, could be at-
• tributed to the confusion following the inauguration of the corps, and, to 
substantiate it, the fact would be mentioned that the sum ¥20,000,000,000 
appropriated for the police Reserve expenditures was transferred from the 
national bond expenditures and that spending had been in charge of the 
Nat:ional Rural Police until the business was taken over by the Police 
Reserve on November 30, 1950. The following passage in the Report, 
however, should not be overlooked; 
"The major items in the amount len over to the following year com-
prise ¥3,862,000,000 for purchasing apparel and vehicles and ¥2,851,000, 
000 for erecting establishments. That such a vast amount had to be left 
over was due to the inadequacy of Japan's production 'capacity to meet 
big demands. The situation was the worst with regard to communications 
machines, for none of this particular category could be delivered within 
the prescribed year (Refer 1950-51 Audit Report)." Probably this bespeaks 
the circumstance that the very inauguration of the Police Reserve was not 
prompted by a national will, and, therefore, was not backed by a nation-
wide economic support. This, of course, refers to the inaugural period, 
during and after the Korean War, when the American Army poured Japan's 
industry, with special procurement orders while the Japanese Government 
generously financed and invested large funds in the post-war munitions 
industry, which, thus encouraged, witnessed a phenomenal expansion. The 
expansion has since continued so steadily thatJapan's production capacity, 
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especially concerning the production of ammunition, fire-arms and guns is 
now several times as the Defence Agency demands. (Refer Table I) This 
situation has naturally prompted manufacturers of Japan to campaign for 
the acquisition of munitions orders from America, while, at the same time, 
they are madly placing hopes on additional economic aid to come from 
America, as well as endeavoring to introduce new technical knowledge 
about atomic power and the manufacture of jet aircrafts. 
Table I. Comparison of Japan's Production Capacity per Year of Defence 
Industry and Demands (in Peacetime) of Self-Defence Corps 
(Unit 1,000 pieces) 
Production Demands of 
capacity Self Defence 
per year Corps 
Ammunition 
I 4.2 in. trench-mortar shells 500 100 
81 kg. trench-mortar shells 1,200 I 270 
60 mm. trench-mortar sheIls 600 I 370 
155 mm. cannon shells 400 60 
105 mm. cannon shells 800 100 
Rocket shells 900 1,100 
75 mm. no-reaction cannon balls 200 , 90 
0.3 in. bullets 100,000 80,000 
0.5 in. bullets 10,000 4,100 
Cannon Pieces 
Rocket guns 6,000 800 
No-reaction cannons 1,500 50 
4.2 in. trench-mortars 500 
I 
50 
60 mm. trench-mortars 500 I 100 
(Defence Year Book 1955) 
This is inevitably giving rise to cases of budgetary misappropriations 
and official corruption, which differ in nature and shape from those often 
seen right after the inauguration of the Police Reserve. To witness,. are 
not the manufacturers, unduly scared by a statement attributed to Mr. 
Ross, to the effect that the "special procurement orders during. the current 
fiscal year ending June 30 will amount to only $ 10,000,000" clamoring for 
everything in order that their possible loss be covered by placing their 
surplus production establishment and stocks under State ownership? In 
short, it may seem proper that the problem of budgetary irregularities, often 
involving cases of bribery, relating to the expenditures of the Defence 
Agency, is to be viewed from the angle of the political and economic de-
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pendency which the present-day Japan is subjected to. 
II. Dependency As Seen in The Defence Agency Expenditures. 
It has already been mentioned that, at the time of the inauguration of 
the Police Reserve, the lack of a corresponding national economic founda-
tion to support such a step brought about an increased amount of budge-
tary funds turned over to the subsequent year. In spite of a change of 
circumstance in later years, however, the turned-over amount of the Defence 
expenditures, especially the expenditures of the Defence Agency, continued 
to rise, as shown in Table II. 
Table II. Defence Expenditures and Amount Turned Over. 
(Unit ¥ 100·million) 
[. 1952 1953 
Bud- Turn- Ac- Bud- Tum- Ac- Bud-
get ed tual get ed tual get 
over over 
Defence outlay ..................... 650 
-
650 620 91 
- -
Defence Agency expenditures··· 591 152 743 613 280 893 742 
Security expenses .................. 560 - 560 - 302 302 -
Peace restoration .................. 110 100 210 30 58 88 150 
Allied property ..................... 100 - 100 4 96 100 26 












Of course, some items of the weapons and equipment in demand for 
Self-Defence Force may not be produced' by the present-day munitions 
industry of Japan. In other items, at the same time, production may well 
be in excess of the demand. Such unbalanced state, generallg speaking, 
should invariably be expected in munitions industry, for here speculative 
factors work more openly. In this light, it may be called unjust to find 
the large amounts of turned-over budgetary funds in the failure of produc-
tion to meet the munitions demand. . 
The present writer, in this connection, is of the opinion that the large 
amounts of Defence budgetary funds turned over should be considered to 
be inseparably related to the afore-mentioned increasing instances of inap-
prl[)plial~e budgetary disposals. And the reason for all this, in his view, 
OU<>lUQ be sought in the fact that Japan's Defence budget is directly linked 
American defence strategy with the result that the compilation of 
t"bUdlget is made without a definitely defined autonomous foundation. 
tt~~efl::rriing to Table II, it is obvious that, while mere one hundred or 
million yen is sought after for social welfare, educational or 
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relief funds, no less than 500-million to aOO-million yen, originally allotted 
for Defence purposes, is annually being turned over unused. Such, indeed, 
should well be said to be a case of undue lassitude in the application of 
legal provision permitting the unconsumed budgetary funds to be turned 
over. The perennial existence of large amounts of such turned-over funds, 
especially in regard to the expenditures of the Defence Agency, it has been 
pointed out, is, no doubt, due, to a large extent, to the carelessness in the 
compilation of budget and. to the practice that non-urgent plans are liable 
to be hastily budgetized. This perfectly coincides with the view of the 
Board of Audit expressed in its Audit Report in regard to irregularities in 
spending. Then, why is such situation engendered in relation to the com-
pilation of the Defence Agency budget? 
That the compilation of the Defence Agency budget is often under-
taken without any clearly-defined foundation or criterion of compultation has 
already been pointed out by even the officials of the very Agency in charge 
of the budgetary spending. 
It is obvious that the organization and equipment of the Self-Defence 
Force Units should afford the basis on which a budget is compiled, and, in 
order that such is made practically feasible, there must be available a 
more-or-less definite plan and future prospect of the unit organization and 
its equipment. Take the instance of the communications unit.· The num-
ber of companies composing a unit, and the number of field wireless sets, ' 
and of trucks and jeeps to be allotted to each company should be clearly 
known. The same applies to the case of a tank unit. How many compa-
nies are to be set up to compose a unit, and how many guns and how many 
accompanying automatic cars should be allotted to each company? Such, 
indeed, constitutes one of the fundamental considerations in organizing a 
fighting unit, which, in its turn, is directly linked to the highest strategical 
and tactical plans. The plight of the Japanese Government and its Defence 
Agency, as far as the present circumstances are concerned, is that neither 
of them is in a position to make decisions on these plans on its own merit. 
It is seen, thus, that the Defence Agency, in undertaking compilation of 
its budget, lacks a clearly-set basis on which the work is to be advanced. 
Secondly, the expenditures for installation, which are in size compara-
ble to those for equipment, are spent for camps, fire-ranges, drill grounds, 
supply depots, hospitals and schools. In certain cases, the Self-Defence 
units employ such camps and drill grounds turned over by the American 
forces; or, in certain cases, installations are in joint use by both the J apa-
nese and American units. In all these cases, the estimates of expenditures 
for this particular field should unavoidably be affected by the consideration 
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whether such installations presently in use by the Ameaicans are going to 
be turned over or not; or whether any additional American units are to be 
withdrawn, or, whether, on the contrary, the American forces are about to 
be reinforced. Clear prediction in such regard, however, is often out of ques-
tion, hence the inevitable ambiguity in the entire aspect of the Defence 
Agency budgetary estimates. In case of a joint use of an installation, it 
may even be assumed that budgetary money, separately defined under 
Defence Agency expenditures, Japan's share of defence money and various 
expenses for security purposes are mutually appropriated. A recent instance 
may be cited in this regard. The Air Self-Defence Force made its debut 
in 1954, with its budgetary estimates standing at ¥ 4,500-million, providing 
for 6,287 Self-Defence officers and 478 stoff officials. One of the plans 
under contemplation provides for the training of its pilots, land crews and 
rader operators at American air bases. In the course of the compilation 
of the budget for the 1955-56 fiscal year, the Japanese Government, in 
return fOl" the acceptance of its request for a reduction of its share in defence 
funds, had to accede to the American demand that the runways for Jet 
aircraft be expanded. As it is presumed that ¥7,900-mitlion provided for 
in the general defence outlays is inadequate to fully satisfy this demand, 
the authorities of the Procurement Agency are understood to be contempla-
ting, in case expansion of the runways to the extent the Americans demand 
is found to be practically out of question, to undertake at its own expenses 
to expand the American airfields it is now permitted to use. This single 
instance is fully indicative how far items involved in the Defence Expend-
itures may, under necessity, be mutually appropriated. 
Thirdly, the problem of the loan and grant of arms is to be taken up, 
for this is another factor which makes the contents of the defence budget 
ambiguous. Prior to the conclusion of the MS~ agreement between Ame-
rica and Japan, there existed no definite contract or provision for the loan 
of arms, and the use of American arms by the Japanese was tacitly acqui-
esced to. Under such circumstances, the Americans naturally exercised the 
right of supervision to its fullest extent involving even the use of arm~. 
The MSA agreement provided that Army weapons be loaned to the Japa-
nese units. However, the American Military Advisory Group stationed in 
Japan i~ even now invested with the right (I) of determining the shortage 
of munition items existing in that country and advising that country to 
prepare to request for military aid j (2) of advising and assisting the recip-
ient country regarding the registration, supervision, storage and proper use 
of arms delivered; (3) of supervising the condition of use and maintenance 
of the equipment offered by America, of making a report thereanent and 
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of taking such measures that these are employed for the attainment of the 
prescribed purposes and (4) of promoting the establishment and increase of 
training facilities on the part of the recipient country in order that its 
dependency on America be lessened in regard to troop training. Concern-
ing naval vessels, it is provided in the American-Japanese Agreement on 
the Loan of Naval Vessels that all such naval vessels and their equipment 
belong to America, and that the Japanese Government, without prior ap-
proval of the American Government, may not discard or remodel the naval 
vessels and their equipment, tools, reserve and exchange parts, or may not 
reveal drawings, specifications and other informations concerning them. 
In the light of these facts, it is evident that, although, after the con-
clusion of the MSA agreement, a certain liberty was allowed to the J apa-
nese Government concerning the use of arms delivered by America, the view 
and attitude of either the American Military Advisory Group in Japan or 
the American Government greatly affects the quantity and category of arms 
to be delivered to Japan. Again, the use and storage of arms is influenced 
to a large extent througe the supervision, examination, advice and report 
concerning the use of arms. Now, the issue at stake is the fact that 
the parts, replacement items and various accessory equipment (including 
trucks, jeeps, trailers, communication apparatuses, etc.), excepting the finil>hed 
arms, are stipulated to be supplied by Japan, and, as such, are to be 
mentioned in the budgetary estimates of the Defence Agency. It 
goes without saying that finished arms and their equipment are mutually 
connected closely and inseparably. In case, therefore, the American inten-
tion regarding the delivery of finished arms and their use and storage is 
not revealed to the Japanese authorities concerned, the latter would inevi-
tably find themselves in a highly awkward position relating to the compila-
tion of the Defence Agency budget. For instance, the number of cannons 
to be delivered to a certain unit will inevitably affect the number of trucks, 
automatic cars, wireless sets and other equ~pment fixed for that unit. If 
the former is not definitely known, the Self-Defence Force authorities may 
not know how to adequately prepare necessary equipment. Actual cases, 
in this regard, are cited below. 
The yearly running expenses for the Land Self-Defence Force for 1954 














(From Defence Year-Book) 
Now, taking up the Non-Personal expenses as mentioned in the above 
Table, the figure includes ¥2,100-million out of ¥4,500-million, which is 
supplementary to a total sum of ¥ 34,400-million for 11O,000-man equip-
ment. The balance of ¥2,400-million is provided for under the expecta-
tion that America supplies Japan with vehicles, communication apparatuses 
and installation machines, in particular. Thus, it is seen that this specific 
item is based on a highly ambiguons supposition. 
Again, the initial expenses for the increase of 20,000 men for the 1954 












(From Defence Year-Book) 
That no expenses are provided for the equipment requires explanation. 
Actually, sum of ¥ 14,400-million is computed for this item. The absence 
of this in the above Table, however, is due to the fact that about ¥ 5, 
500-million worth equipment is expected to be supplied by America while 
the stocked equipment is to fill up the balance of ¥8,900-million. The 
expenses for installations, it is explained, were curtailed under expectation 
that American installations would be utilized. 
The important problem in connection with the loan or delivery of arms 
lies in the fact that the entire range of arms, which most explicitly repre-
sent the progress of military technique and which often determine the or-
ganization of combat units and even their operational objective, is supplied 
by America. True, it is a fact, as openly admitted by the officials of the 
Defence Agency, that the fighting efficiency of the Self-Defence Force, 
particularly regarding its fire power and maneuverability, far surpasses the 
defunct Imperial Army. Speaking of the maneuverability, for instance, a 
number of jeeps, trucks, communication apparatuses and bulldozers are al-
lotted to infantry, artillery or engineering regiments. A comparison of the 
fire power of the defunct Imperial Army division and the present District 
Corps, respectively is made in Table III. 
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Table III. Fire Power of Defunct Imperial Army and Self· Defence 
Force Compared. 
. Defunct Division 
I 
District Corps 
I Remarks of SDF 
Rifles 21,500 10,675 Firing volume per minute: District Corps is about 10 
times that of o~d Division. 
Machine gune 471 591 Firing vo]ume per miunte: District Corps is about 5 ti-





Firing volume per miunte: 
cannon Non-reaction about 5 times. 







721 District corps has more large-calibre guns. 
Further, a comparison between the arms delivered to Japan under the 
MSA Agreement and those home-made arms delivered to the defunct Im-
perial Army in 1937-38 shows that the former category is superior both in 
efficiency and quantity as well as category. This is especially so with re~ard 
to cannons, wireless apparatuses, trucks and trailers. 
Of course, it is undeniable that, even with their superiority over the 
old Japanese Army equipment, these arms handed over by America are 
considerably inferior to their counterparts actually being used by the Amer-
ican fighting units, and that they lag behind the standards of progress 
being attained by world military technique. All in all, however, it is easy 
to see that Japan's moves toward re-armament on the strength of American 
arms and equipment in surplus loaned under a specific provision of agree-
ment is liable to create various repercussions to bear upon the compilation 
and execution of the Defence Agency budget. For one thing, the use of 
American equipment, which, in nature, is generally "luxurious" as compared 
to the na'tive one, may unavoidably lead to extravagancies in the excution 
of the Defence budget which has already been pointed out by the Board 
. of Audit. Secondly, the impossibility of prediction about the quantity, kinds 
and prices of the arms scheduled for delivery will easily induce confusion 
and lack of premeditated 'plans regarding the purchase of materials and 
equipment to match such arms. Again, considerable time will be required 
before the structure and operation of highlydeve10ped weapons coming from 
America is fully familiarized. In other words, overdue time taken for trial 
manufacture, determination of standards, formulation of specifications and 
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assessment of original prices prior to placing orders with necessary arms and 
munitions will easily result in having a large proportion of the budgetary 
appropriations left over to the next year. 
The present writer, of course, does not assert that if the arms are pro-
duced domestically instead of being loaned by a foreign country, such 
extravagancies in spending will cease to occur. That the dependency and 
lack of properly-defined programs on the part of Japan's munition industry 
is causing a surplus of production facilities has already previously been 
pointed out. This may be said, specifically, about the scheduled" home 
production" of Jet fighters spread over three years from July this year. 
While it is simply the process of assembling, amounting to about 40 % of 
the total production cost, that Japan, shares under the name of" home 
production ", it is easily predictable that Japan, in future, will be called 
upon to pay tremendous sacrifices in the field of aircraft manufacture. Air-
craft wears fast. Its maintenance and replacement requires lots of money. 
Not only that but the rapid progress of aeronautical technique involving 
the need for devising novel types and designs is sure to make the problem 
of mass production a highly knotty one. Actually, a certain company, which 
was quick enough to invest on a major scale for aircraft production, is 
reported to have suffered a big loss due to a drastic change of the "Defence 
Plans." I t is known that F 86 Jet fighters are no longer the first-line 
planes, their planes, their place being taken over by F 100 and 102 figh-
ters. Or, the case of Italy, member state of NATO, may be cited. Italy 
planned to assemble F 86 fighters. Her plan, however, ended up in utter 
failure because of too high cost involved. These instances amply point to the 
dangers inherent in aircraft industry. Probably the need to cover the loss 
already suffered in the investment mnde in this indnatry may prompt Japan 
to continue production of aircraft in spite of such dangers. In a word, 
Japan's aircraft industry is destined to cover a danger with another, result-
ing in doubling the loss involved, which, in turn, will eventually entail a 
larger financial burden. And, the point here is that Japan's aircraft indu-
stry is in such a position that it is forced to function under special sub-
contract with senior American industrialists with their outdated production 
facilities and investment risks. Such, indeed, is the undisguised shape of 
Japan's defence industry in general! 
Irregularities and extravagancies in spending defence budgetary funds, 
as referred to previously, stem from the abject dependency of the defence 
industry, or, more fundamentally, of the national economy of Japan. 
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III. The Defence Agency Expenditures And Japan's Shares 
of Defence Expenses. 
Although it is undeniable that cases of wasteful spending of, and ir-
regularities in, the expenditures of the Defence Agency have, in most instan-
ces, resulted from the dependency of the entire structure, as has already 
been pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the problem involves a certain 
other aspect, which, comparatively speaking has escaped attention. The 
existence of such is insinuated, for one thing, in the Report compiled by 
the Board of Audit. The point in question pertains to the fact that, be-
cause of the resistance, conscious or unconscious, on the part of the nation 
being voiced against the rearmament of Japan, which is steadily being pushed 
ahead irrespective of the people's sentiment, the projected reinforcement of 
the personnel and equipment is apt to lag behind the plan, with the result 
that supplies and paraphernalia are liable to be purchased in excess of 
actual needs. The reminder in the Audit Report for 1952 to the effect 
that "the plan for the purchase of supplies are being executed in disregard 
of the actual situation pertaining to the personnel, equipment and ma-
chines," is sufficient to suggest it. In August 1952, the army staff of the 
then Board of Public Security purchased 7,388 sets of folding cots for field 
hospitals for ~"18,987,160. The number of such sets actually needed for 
75,000-man Security Force, however, ought to have been 2,888 sets. Even 
consideririg a subsequent increase of the personnel by 35,000 men the number 
could have been 3,408 sets, with the balance of 3,980 being registered as 
"purchase in excess." Question naturally arises as to what the Public 
Security Board authorities were then expecting its personnel to come up to. 
The 7,388 sets would have been sufficient to accommodate no less than 
190,000 men. Even allowing for a certain number of reserve, it would be 
safe to presume that the authorities were assessing the number on the sup-
position that the personnel would be around 140,000 or 150,000. Actually, 
however, the increase was to 110,000 men from the initial 75,000. Other 
similar instances could be cited. As has been mentioned in Chapter I of 
the present study, the Audit Report for 1953 points to the excessive purchase 
of anti-air cloth plates for air signal. While the fixed number of such 
signal plates to be needed by 75,000-men Force would be 7,787, the major 
part of them had already been purchased during 1952. Besides, purchases 
in excess of the fixed personnel were previously being made since the time 
the Force comprised mere 75,000 men. Farther, wire operation cars were 
purchased in numbers to provide for three companies of communications 
battalion, whereas, actually, such battalion consists of mere two companies. 
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In view of these facts, it would even be suspected that the authorities con-
cerned had to purchase supplies and equipment under anticipation that 
certain military operations on the strength of personnel in excess of actual 
numbers were being contemplated. More explicit instances pertain to mil-
itary establishment and lots of ground specially requisitioned. While it is 
widely known that the nation is against the expansion and even the exis-
tence of American military bases on Japanese soil, there should be no 
question of differentiating between the ground to be used by the American 
Force and the Japanese Self-Defence Force, respectively, as seen from the 
viewpoint of the agreed joint use of these American bases in Japan. It is 
a fact, further, that vigorous opposition is being raised against the purchase 
of ground by the Defence Agency (inculuding the lots for army barracks, 
drills and hospitals, etc.) This could be known from the reminder in the 
1953 Audit Report to the effect that one reason for the large amount of 
the Defence Agency appropriation being left over to the next year is that 
"unexpectedly long period of time was needed for the selection and purchase 
of ground intended for the construction of necessary military establishment." 
The Board of Audit, of course, is in a position to see to it that money 
be spent adequately by the Self-Defence Force. From the standpoint of 
the nation, however, the issue is pregnant with something more than just 
• that. Speaking from the fundamental principle, the Government effort for 
the rearmament of Japan runs counter to the provisions of the Constitution, 
and, in this sense, the nation should have a say about the way the Defende 
Agency spends money. There is a limit, thus, to the analytical examina-
tion of the expenditures spent by that agency. The nation's position in 
regard to the financial appropriations made available to the Defence Agency 
should be taken into consideration in any sttempt at clarifying the intrinsic 
nature of the Defence Agency expenditures. 
Repeatedly in the past, the fact has been pointed out that military 
expenditnres are liable to bring pressure to bear upon the national economy, 
and this aspect is brought to the fore most clearly in the 1955-56 budget. 
Indications are that the relationship between military spending and national 
economy will be clarified more than ever before. The first effect was seen 
on the much-publicizced Government program for housing construction. 
Nominally, the Government appears to be spending more on housing; 
actually, however, spending per unit of government-sponsored dwelling 
houses is curtailed in addition to the fact the area of land allotted per 
unit is mere 6.5 tsubo. Stricter restrictions are to be imposed on the finan-
cing by the Housing Financing Corporation. Besides, substantially affected 
are Government spendings on the measures for unemployment relief, relief 
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for destitute people and for tuberculosis patients, for educational establish_ 
ments, for fores~ation and irrigation, for natural disaster rehabilitation and 
for increased production of foodstuffs, for expenditures for all of these pro-
jects, for which the national demand is high, are to be curtailed both nom-
inally and actually. These expenditures, urgently needed for maintaining 
the national living standard on a reasonable level, are actually disbursed 
in the form of subsidies to local communities. A substantial reduction in 
the amount of these subsidies, coupled with inadequate tax transference to 
prefectural governments for the current year, is about to usher in an un-
precedented situation, as far as local financial condition is concerned, that 
financial deficit recorded by local prefectural governments will amount to 
no less than ¥ 14,OOO-million. As responsible for all this should be counted 
the irresponsible government attitude in compiling its budget, for, while 
peremptorily forcing the nation to materially suffer from the curtailed ex-
penditures on social welfare as housing projects, the Government is all too 
eager to live up to its arbitrary pledges given the United States that it 
redouble its effort to reinforce Japan's defence setup. This circumstance is 
most unmistakably indicated in the 1955-56 budget. Critics have already 
referred to this particular aspect in their articles so far published in news-
papers and magazines. No need here, therefore, to further elaborate on the 
question. Attempt at clarifying the nature of the Defence Agency expen-
ditures will be confined here to an examination of various relevant facts 
which came to the fore in the course of the budget compilation for the 
1955-56 fiscal year. 
Needless to say, the two major issues which stood in the way of this 
budget concerned the payment for the surplus wheat purchased from Amer-
ica and the curtailment of Japan's share in defence expenditures. The 
latter issue assumed such grave proportion that its settlement was considered 
to be the prerequiste for the compilation of the budget. The situation 
served to convince the nation at large of the extent to which the Japanese 
Government relied upon the United States. The issue of Japan's share in 
defence loomed so large that the Japanese people had the impression that 
the entire question of budget compilation was focussed upon this single 
aspect, and, then, it was inevitable that what Japan had to spend for bo-
osting its defence structure should stand diametrically opposed to the fur-
therance of national welfare. However, so far as the Hatoyama Govern-
ment stood pat on a reduction of Japan's defence share, the general impres-
sion gained was that it was fighting hard to protect the national interests. 
On the other hand, the issue was viewed from still another angle by a 
certain other faction of the people, who were eager to demand a "rearma-
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ment that befits an independent nation." To these people, the question at 
stake comprised a confrontation between Japan's defence share and the De-
fence Agency expenditures, or that between the Hatoyama regime and the 
American Government, including its military group. In the following lines, 
attempt will be made to clarify the stand of the American government or 
its military clique, and, further, the position of the Japanese government 
under Democratic Party leader, Ichiro Hatoyama, and a faction of people 
who favor rearmament, supporting him, which became evident in the course 
of the much-retarded 1955-56 budget compilation. 
In the stand held by the American government while the Japanese 
budget was in the course of compilation and in the statements and declara-
tions made by high officials of the American government and certain mili-
tary representary representatives, who, in succession, visited Japan during 
this period, it was clearly discerned that the American government authori-
ties were intent upon economizing spending of the dollar, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, on asking Japan to' redouble its defence effort at the 
sacrifice of the Japanese nation. It may be pointed out, in this connection, 
that the issue of the purchase of the American surplus wheat has already 
been utilized by the American government as part of the MSA aid to Japan. 
Further, the major portion of the payment for the surplus wheat was made 
available to the Japanese government,'against its expressed wish, in the share 
of a loan, while the remainder was to be used for off-shore purchases in 
the place of usual special procurement. In spite of a previous understan-
ding that the payment made in the yen for the surplus agricultural products 
purchased by the Japanese government would not be appropriated for the 
special procurement in the dollar, the yen currency amounting to ¥ 14,400-
million in the hands of the American government, had, during last year, 
been used to pay for special procurement purchases, which means that J a-
pan's dollar income had decreased to that extent. Mr. Irving Ross, Ac-
ting Assistant Secretary of State, who came to Japan some time ago, is 
reported to have declared that" special procurement orders to Japan up to 
June 30 would mount to $ IO-million." His remark immediately plunged 
the whole munitions industry of Japan into a virtual panic. He was also 
understood to have asked the Japanese Government, in exchange for his 
approval of placing another $ 20-miIlion procurement orders, to take steps 
to properly of Japan's munitions industry by purchasing its installations 
with Government funds, financing funds needed for their maintenance and 
supplying funds intended for production, conversion and increasing orders 
to be issued by the Defence Agency. On the other hand, Mr. Harold 
Stassen, Director of the International Cooparation Administration, and As-
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sistant Secretary of Defence Hensel, as press reports said, pointed to the 
fact that Japan's military expenditures amounted to only 2.5% of the total 
national income of Japan. Especially, in this connection, the latter was 
reported to have remarked that an industrially advanced country as Japan 
should advance the percentage, at least, to between 3 and 4%, that she 
should maintain a munitions industry on the strength of her own resources, 
and that future emphasis should be placed on the replenishment of her air 
force strength. These statements, combined, would offer ample indications 
as to the intentions of the United States government in regard to her rela-
tions with Japan. It needs not be reminded here that, even in case Japan's 
self-defence is strengthened with Japan's own money, such force would not 
be recognized by America as a "military unit of an indepent country," 
as withness the peculiar characteristics of the Defence Agency expenditures, 
of which mention has already been made earlier. 
What, then, are the intentions of the Hatoyama Government and the 
pro-rearmament faction which supportes it? It is probably evident, for one 
thing, that they find in the rearmament program, including the expansion of 
the Self-Defence Force, a "breakthrough" out of the political and econo-
mic "bottle-neck," which confronts Japan at the present stage. It would 
even be said that such intentions have come up to the fore, most. distinctly 
and positively, than in the days of the Yoshida regime. There are quite 
a number of instances to substantiate this interpretation. e.g. Premier Ha-
toyama, on several occasions, has expressed himself in favor of a Constitu-
tional amendment and the enforcement of a conscription system; ex-Director 
Omura of the Defence Agency, asserting the need for interpreting the pro-
visions of the Constitution in a broadened sense, declared that "there would 
be no harm if the selfdefence strength is so expanded that it comes to at-
tain a fighting strength" A six-year defence program has been formulated 
and made public, and Mr. Hatoyama, on the eve of starting on his new 
tenure as Premier, had intended to appoint ex-Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura 
as his Director of the Defence Agency. Thus, it is obvious that, as far 
as the issue of Japan's rearmament and the strengthening of the Self-De-
fence Force are concerned, there can be no fundamental difference in the 
stand taken, respectively, by the United States government and the Hato-
yama regime. At 'he same time, however, Premier Hatoyama, in a similar 
way with his predecessor, Mr. Yoshida, is apparently trying to push ahead 
his program for rearmament and expansion of Japan's selfdefence force in 
such manner that money made available through military special procure-
ment and financial aid from America may be spent with as little restraint 
as possible from across the Pacific. In observance of the basic stand, he 
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at first expected the MSA aid to come in the form of the dollar aid and 
special procurement orders. When this expectation failed to materialize, he 
wanted that two-thirds of the payment for the American surplus wheat be 
made available to Japan in the form of a grant and the remaining one-
third be placed at her disposal by a long-term loan. With regard to the 
portion of Japan's defence share, again, he asked America that Japan's share 
be reduced on account of the fact that what Japan outlays for defence 
consists of tax paid by the Japanese people, and, that, in spite of this, it 
is placed in "America's joint accounts for the use of the Americans. It was 
inevitable, however, that all such expectations and desires on the part of 
the Japanese should have failed to materialize, and, the fact which now 
stands in the face of the Japanese nation is that rearmament programs are 
being vigorously pushed on in a fashion which is highly disadvantageous 
to Japan. Herein lies a discrepancy-discrepancy in the method and proce-
dures for realizing their respective intentions, and not in the fundamental 
issue itself, which pertains to rearmament and strengthening of the Self-
Defence Force. In substance, therefore, the negotiations held between Japan 
and America early this year on the controversial Japan's defence share were 
more about how Japan's rearmament program be advanced, or, in other 
words, on how the funds available" to the Defence Agency be increased, 
rather than about a mere reduction of the amount which goes to Japan's share. 
With agreement of views having, already reached on the strengthening 
of the Self-Defence Force, why should Japanese and American government 
officials hit ve confronted so sharply to each other over the issue of a reduc-
tion of Japan's defence share? An explanation will, perhaps, be found in 
the attitude of the Hatoyama government, for it endeavored to fulfill its 
election pledges by curtailing general defence spending, especially Japan's 
share in the defence expenditures. Even so, as the Hatoyama Cabinet was 
trying to increase the Defence Agency expenditures as compared with last 
year, it appeared as if the real issue existed in the confrontation between 
the Defence Agency outlays and Japan's defence share, or, in other words, 
between Japan's national demands and Japan's share in defence funds. 
Behind the apparent confrontation, it should not be lost 'Sight of, however, 
that the pro-rearmament factions at work both in Japan and America were 
closely collaborating in order that the money made available to the Defence 
Agency be rapidly increased, and that, for that purpose, they came to a 
compromise on the reduction of Japan's defence share, which stood so clo-
sely linked to the Defence Agency expenditures. 
," To show the process, Table IV is hereby referred to, which indicates 
the' relationship between the Defence Agency expenditures and defence 
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outlays (consisting of defence share + funds involved in supplying Americat 
military units with necessary establishment + expenses pertaining to the 
American Military Advisory Group in Tokyo). 
With regard to the 1954-55 budget as shown in Table IV, it is seen. 
that, both in the case of the draft budget formulated by the Government, 
and of the initial budget with American desires taken in, the Defence 
Agency spending was increased to a larger extent than the general defence 
outlays were decreased. 
Table IV. Relation Between General Defence Outlays And Defence 
Agency Expenditures. (Unit ¥ JOO,million) 
Defence Reduc· DA Ex· Increase Total 
Outlays tion pendi- from Defence 
from Pre- tures Previous spending 
vious Year 
Year 
1953-54 budget 620 
I 
613 
I 1954-55 budget 
-
Draft budget (559) (60) I (813) I (200) 1327 
Initial budget 584 35 i 788 I 175 
Working budget I 743 I 130 " " 
1955-56 budget I , 
I Original budget plan (400) (180) (800) 
I 
(57) ( 1200) 
Demanded by DA (952) (200) 
(6-Year Defence 
Plan) 
I Initial budget 459 125 868 125 1327 
While it is unmistakably noted that a rapid increase of the Defence 
Agency spending represents a fundamental demand on the part of both the 
Japanese and· American pro-rearmament factions, it should, at the same 
time, observed that American has agreed to a reduction of Japan's defence 
share simply as an expedient to speed up the realization of such desire. 
This perfectly coincides with the American stand indicated in the so-called 
Allison memorandttm, to the effect that "the United States government 
agrees to a reduction of Japan's defence share to the amount equivalent 
to a half of the amount in excess of the basic ¥ 90,OOO-million expendi-
tures allotted to the Defence Agency." Seen in this light, it should have 
been a matter of regret, indeed, that, in· the 1954-55 working budget, the 
expenditures by the Defence Agency were cut. In this connection, Assis-
tant Secretary of Defence Hensel may be quoted, who, in March this year, 
is said to have remarked to the following effect in a way of expressing his 
disappointment over the election results in Japan, particularly in regard to 
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the political advances made by the antirearmament elements: "It was extre-
mely regrettable that the Japanese government has taken steps to cut the 
the Defence Agency expenditures, when last year the United States govern-
ment agreed to a reduction of Japan's defence share." (Refer the Asahi 
Shimbun, March 7) 
It was only a matter of course, then, that a close contact has continued 
to be kept between the pro-rearmament factions in Japan and America in a 
gesture to be assured of an increased spending by the Defence Agency. In 
his statement, above referred to, Assistant Secretary of Defence Hensel en-
dorsed the stand of ex-Director Omura of the Defence Agency, that "wh-
ereas a Constitutional amendment is apparently out of question, at least, 
for the time being, the government, in spite of it, plans to increase the 
Self-Defence Force by 35,000 men next year." Mr. Omura even went fur-
ther to say that it should be possible that the self-defensive strength be 
possible that the self-defensive strengh be raised to a fighting capability 
within the framework of the Constitution. The Defence Agency budget, 
after the personnel increase as mentioned above is realized will amount to 
about ¥ 90,000-million. This corresponds to the outlays for the initial year 
under the 6-year Defence Plan, amounting to ¥95,200-million, and, also, 
to the budgetary demands submitted by the Defence Agency for the 1955-
56 fiscal year. The 6-year defence plan, incidentally, has been received 
favorably in the munitions industry circles of Japan, where it was hailed 
as a milestone to Japan's self-defence policy as well as a guidance to de-
fence production. On the basis of the 6-year plan laid down by the go-
vernml':nt, the defence production committes of the Federation of Managers' 
Organizations is said to be revamping its. own defence production program. 
It is noted, further, that the abovementioned Allison Memorandum alluded 
to the sum of ¥90,000-million to be spent for the initial year of the 6-
year plan, as the "Basic figure of the Defence Agency expenditures." 
Of cOurse, the appropriations to the Defence Agency for 1955, as shown 
in Table IV, are a little less than the above-mentioned figure. A budget 
plan, originally, is a product of compromise, and compromise in this par-
ticular case was the agreement by the pro-rearmament elements that the 
total outlays for defence purposes be maintained on last year's level of 
¥ I 32,700-million. The government draft budget plan prior to the showng 
to America for approval and the budget approved by the Japanese Diet 
had nothing in common, either of both embodying quite different contents. 
In the original budget plan formulated by the government, the appropria-
tions to the Defence Agency were less than the so-called "basic figure." 
while the extent the defence outlays were cut was far larger than that of 
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increase seen in the Defence Agency spending as compared with last year. 
This was because the Hatoyama goverment was eager to make a gesture of 
living up to its election pledges and find ways and means for the avowed 
cut in the Defence Agency spending. In the final form of the budget, 
however the reduction of the defence outlays at once entailed a correspon-
ding rise in the Defence Agency appropriations. It is seen, thus, that the 
total defence spending, including both the general defence outlays and the 
Defence Agency expenditures, is so computed that desires of the nation at 
large have no room to have themselves represented in the budgetary for-
mulation of such expenditures. Further, the Japanese-American joint sta-
tement, the outcome of the long-procratinated talk between these two cou-
ntries on the cut of Japan's defence share, clearly indicates that the inten-
tions of the pro-rearmament factions, especially in America, have basically 
been realized, for the statement makes it clear, first, that a cut of the' J a-
pan's defence share shall not be repeated next year, that the Defence A-
gency appropriations shall be increased next year to an extent larger than 
the defence share was cut for the current year, that the sum of ¥22,700-
million, which has been left over from 1954, shall be used exclusively for 
defence purposes, and that the Defence Agency shall be authorized to 
contract, outside the framework of the budget, up to the amount of 
¥ 15,400-million. 
The nature of the Deffence Agency expenditures, in the view of the 
presen t writer has been clarified in the foregoing lines. Spending by the 
Agency basically stands opposed to the various demands on the part of 
nation at large, and, as such, is bound to bring about various issues 
in the course of the actual execution of the Agency's budgetary ap-
propnatlOns. Especially, in regard to local financial conditions, the nation 
in general will be asked to witness emergence of a number of insurmoun-
table problems during the course of the current year. This is because local 
economy, more than anything else, offers the place where national demands 
for promotion of social welfare, etc. and the demands for armament con-
front against each other most basically and violently. It will be inevitable, 
thus, that move will be found to come afoot for a "conservative merger" 
in order that the political position of the present government be streng-
thened and its ties with the United States be made even closer. However, 
it would be unavoidable that, as the government continues to stand op-
posed to the interests of the nation, conflict between Japan and America, 
especially between the pro-rearmament elements in both countries, will 
become sharper, as witness the difficulties encountered in the course of the 
compilation of the 1955-56 budget. 
